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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

A CRISIS OF STRATEGY THE UNITED STATES MILITARY AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

BY 19980504 156

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by

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ABSTRACT

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The more we learn as a military about maximizing our effectiveness in complex contingency operations the more it becomes clear that we need strategic level doctrine to deal with the non military elements on the battlefield.

Tactically and operationally we have in place sound practices and procedures. Things like CMOCs and HACs and the role of the Civil Affairs officer are already in place and working. What is needed now is the linkage to the strategic level, a system to integrate and plan NGO/PVO involvement at the national level, in the Pentagon and at the CINC staffs before conflict begins.

This paper specifically addresses an approach to better integrating, at the strategic level, the NGO/PVO elements of any future operation whether it be a complex contingency like peacekeeping or actual conventional war. The strategic impact of the NGO/PVO on the battlefield will be shown by glancing at recent operations and an ends ways and means analysis for implementing a national strategy will be proposed. This is a matter of strategic importance.

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
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Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) have brought about new challenges to warfighting doctrine. Humanitarian and peacekeeping operations are now the predominate form of United States military operations being conducted today. While doctrine exists for these type of operations, we have only scratched the surface on truly developing a range of manuals, doctrinal support tools and training systems to meet the new need for this type of focus and study. One very important area of these types of operations is the integration of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Organizations (PVOs). In this we do not have a clear doctrine at the strategic level. We are attempting to capture lessons learned and turn out doctrine for this new environment, but the focus is not right. The majority of our lessons learned with respect to the NGO/PVO issue is directed at the tactical and operational level. It stands to reason that we as an army are getting pretty good at that level. In fact the Army's Field Manual 100-3 and the Joint Pub series do a good job of providing techniques and procedures for the tactical commanders. Thanks to the innovation of our junior commanders and leaders on the ground, we have in fact integrated the planning of NGO/PVO presence on the battlefield.

Additionally, the NGO/PVO problem is similar to the Inter-Agency Process and there has been much written on this topic. Presidential Directive 56 fully addresses the process of interagency coordination in a complex contingency.² This process is fully integrated into military planning and coordination and supporting doctrine has been written. Not true for the NGO/PVO element. We now need the same approach for NGO/PVO. The military-NGO relationship is a fundamental trait of a new era. This

makes the conceptual framework with which one addresses each emergency that much more important.³ There must be a revitalized move to create doctrinal products and procedures at the strategic level of operating. Systems that provide for standard procedures at the National and strategic levels. The NGO/PVO relationship is now an element of strategy and must be a part of any strategic planning. "Other strategic lessons involve understanding the national security implications of a successful NGO/military relationship: the role of the U.N.; and the importance of initiating the NGO/military relationship as soon as possible."

Since Desert Storm, the United States military has participated in or been part of the planning for multiple humanitarian and peace operations around the world.



None of these operations have been unilateral. All have been in conjunction with other organizations such as the United Nations and NATO. The term Complex Contingencies is the term that describes these type of operations where we work in coordination with other agencies and organizations to accomplish the mission. This is where we must develop the doctrine, in the Complex Contingency arena. As in any military operation, commanders seek to achieve unity of effort, maximize the effectiveness of forces assigned to them and to synergize any and all elements of combat power. Why wouldn't the same be for complex contingencies in MOOTW?

The Issue: A Matter of Choice

The more we learn as a military about maximizing our effectiveness in complex contingency operations the more it becomes clear that we need strategic level doctrine to deal with the non-military elements on the battlefield. The NGO/PVO presence on the complex contingency battlefield is a given. They will always be there operating inside the military area of operations and must be handled one way or another. According to Boutrous Boutrous Gali in his published Agenda For Peace:

"The number and role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have greatly expanded over the past decades. As the twentieth century draws to a close, they are being used increasingly by individuals and groups as a channel for direct involvement in national and international affairs."

We have a choice. The US military can continue to view and manage the NGO/PVO presence in the tactical/operational context as we are doing now, or we can elevate the integration and management of the organizations to the strategic realm and greatly increase the effectiveness of the military forces. This is not a new need. The General Assembly of the United Nations, in 1991 through the Secretary General, asked the governments of all member nations to seek ways to enhance the effectiveness of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.

Of course the latter is where we want to be. That is where we must be as we enter the 21st century and encounter more and more complex contingencies as predicted. This paper will specifically address an approach to better integrating, at the strategic level the NGO/PVO elements of any future operation whether it be a complex contingency like peacekeeping or actual conventional war. Tactically and operationally we have in place sound practices and procedures. Things like CMOCs and HACs and the role of the Civil Affairs officer are already in place and working. What is needed now is the linkage to the strategic level, a system to integrate and plan NGO/PVO involvement at the national level, in the Pentagon and at the CINC staffs before conflict begins. The Joint Warfighting center publishes an excellent book titled Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. In it they identify the critical problem of national level coordination.

"The connectivity between NGO/PVO and the Department of Defense is currently ad hoc, with no specific statutory linkage. But

while their focus remains grassroots and their connections informal, NGO and PVO are major players... the sheer number of lives they affect and the resources they provide enable the NGO and PVO community to wield a great deal of power."

Our Doctrine cannot ignore this force that will be on every complex battlefield.

Strategically we have to do a better job of synergizing the NGO/PVO element to fit our military objectives. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen's 1997 annual report to the President and the Congress stated:

"the Department of Defense actively seeks to improve the capabilities of the international community to deal effectively with humanitarian crisis by developing closer ties with and providing assistance to international agencies, non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations and other federal agencies that contribute"

We have no choice but to develop the correctly focused doctrine and establish the framework to integrate the NGO/PVO into our future operations.

There are basic and general points about the nature of NGO/PVO that need to be recognized by all military planners at all levels. Each organization is certainly different

in how they may operate but the following descriptions about all the organizations are valid:

- None are required to follow any military orders
- None are required to report to any military chain of command
- All have their own agenda, which may or may not coincide with national or military objectives
- Someone, somewhere funds the efforts of the organization
- None are obligated or bound by law to work together with the military
- They may or may not request logistic support from the military
- They may or may not have security fears/needs
- They may or may not understand anything about the military
- They may or may not be cooperative with the military
- They may or may not pose a security risk to the military
- They may or may not view the military Area of Operations (AO) as anything different than normal areas to-do their business

These general but valid descriptions are by no means all encompassing. There will be additional and changing characteristics with respect to each organization separately. The clear challenge is for the military commander to manage and integrate the NGO/PVO despite the sometimes difficult traits.

A Vision

Ideally there would be some type of National level system or body that coordinates these organizations before the conflict. Also this coordination would have been conducted among the national leaders who will ultimately make strategic decisions during the operation. The coordination being conducted would be within the context of a broad doctrine, taught in the school system of the military at all levels. There would be the appropriate systems and procedures in place to maximize the unity of effort between the NGO/PVOs and the military. Finally, the appearance of NGO/PVOs on the complex contingency battlefield would not be foreign to the military commanders and junior leaders on the ground. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashville, stated

"What's the relationship between a just arrived military force and the NGO and PVO that might have been working in the area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other."

If we had formalized doctrine that included NGO/PVO as part of an integrated strategy, commanders would not have to start from scratch and create systems to integrate or manage the NGO/PVOs in his AO.

Operations Compared

To illustrate the impact of NGO/PVO on the complex contingency battlefield, two recent and ongoing operations serve as examples of challenges to achieving unity of effort. United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) is an ongoing UN mission in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the NATO mission called Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) in Bosnia. While they are different International Organizations in charge of each mission, they are both complex contingency operations. Additionally, there are many similarities in terms of multinational force structure, normal military chain of command and the challenge of integrating NGO/PVOs in the Area of Operations (AO). Each mission has evolved to relative success.

Macedonia

UNPREDEP has been going on since 1992 as a United Nations mission designed to prevent the spread of war from Bosnia to Macedonia. Unlike Bosnia, the international community, led by the UN, intervened prior to hostilities reaching the country. The US constitutes half of the force deployed in UNPREDEP and many of the NGO/PVOs are American organizations.

The situation in FRYOM is stable and the mission has matured. Because of this relative security, there are many types of NGO/PVOs operating in Macedonia. Also, the methods of operating for each organization have matured to the point that the military commander can clearly see the impact on his mission. This is an important point and is

not always the case in a new and immature theater. The NGO/PVO military relationship in FYROM has reached a balance over the years. Each knows the capabilities, agendas, operating methods and impacts they all have on each other. Over the years the US tactical commander has created a clear working relationship with the various NGOs operating in his sector. Below is a list of some of the organizations that operate in the same Macedonian AO as the military: (note, some are agencys)

- United Nations High Command for Refugee's (UNHCR)
- United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs)
- USAID
- Doctors without Borders
- International Red Cross
- Catholic Relief Organization
- World Food Organization
- World health Organization

All of these organizations impact the military commander in some way. In Macedonia the impact of the NGO/PVOs is mostly logistical. While there is no formally established CMOC, the troop structure does have a Civil Affairs (CA) detachment.

Tactically the CA team handles the civilian populace and coordinates the efforts of the various NGO/PVOs. As long as the situation remains status quo, there is little chance for a lack of military/NGO understanding which could lead to a strategic problem. Even in Macedonia, however, occasional issues of strategic significance do arise.

In November 1995, United Nations military observers strayed across the UN line, which served as a border between Serbia and Macedonia. Their vehicle became stuck in Serbia territory. If detected by the Serbian authorities, the fact that the observers are in Serbia would cause concern at the national level. The observers called on the US military to pull them out. The US contingent took a risk and quickly pulled the observers out undetected. Detection of either the stuck observers or the recovery effort would certainly have caused an international incident and may have led to jeopardizing the overall mission. Prior coordination for this type of support was not formalized. There was a lack of understanding between the US commander and the UNMO organization regarding support relationships. UNMOs expected support, US commander saw no requirement to provide support. Bottom line, support relationships if any should be part of an overall strategic plan developed at the national level. Memorandums of Understanding can be drawn to clarify each others roles and relationship to the other. Macedonia is the example of how clearly defined NGO/Military relationships, that have evolved over time, can serve to increase unity of effort. While this is a good thing, it is not the result of a higher level strategic plan. The success in Macedonia is the result of 5 years of working together at the tactical and operational level. Again the commanders on the ground have figured it out without the benefit of any strategic doctrine. Bosnia on the other hand is a different situation but demonstrates the same need for national doctrine.

Bosnia


The Bosnia mission has not matured to the level Macedonia has evolved. Tactical and operational commanders are wrestling with the issue of NGO/PVOs management on the battlefield. The existing doctrine is being put to practice and is serving its purpose. The purpose is to provide the ground commander with guidelines on how to handle the NGO/PVOs. CMOC are functioning and doing a superb job. Civil affairs officers are performing extraordinary feats of coordination. With any luck, all this good work fits some strategy devised in conjunction with the NGO/PVO leadership at the national level. If this is so, it again is only due to the efforts at the tactical level because there is no national strategy on integrating NGO/PVOs into the military mission in Bosnia. Additionally, unity of effort achieved with all the organizations is only because of the tactical commanders' efforts.

When the military units deployed into Bosnia, October 1994, they encountered many NGO/PVOs in the area. This was expected, however very few of the officers had really ever seen or worked with a NGO/PVO during the military unit's train up. Even those commanders who knew what to expect certainly did not know much about the organizations that would influence the mission daily. The commanders did not know the NGO/PVO agendas, their requirements nor their expectations of the military to provide help. Consequently much time, energy and unity of effort was lost while the military figured out which NGO/PVOs were present, what they would-be asking for and most importantly, how to integrate them into the operation to begin a synergy of effort.

Expectations are out of balance and there is great pressure on the military to provide logistic support to various groups. Frustrations are high due to the lack of any prior coordination on each others purpose and methods of operating. Bottom line, the learning curve was vertical when it did not need to be that way. Again, this is the fault of a lack of military doctrine at the national level.

While the NGO/PVO coordination effort in Bosnia was not a prior nationally coordinated effort, the tactical commanders may have written a few chapters on how to do it that are being captured as lessons learned. An example of this and the need for a national doctrine can be seen in the US Task Force controlling the Northern sector of Bosnia. The key Serb city of Brcko is in this sector.

There is a disputed area between the Republic of Srspska and the Federation called the Posavina Corridor (see map, circled area is the corridor).



The Posavina Corridor is a fertile agricultural area and controls the main roads that reach the Sava river to Croatia. It is disputed because before the war it was majority Croat and Muslim, now it is majority Serb. The Muslim/Croat Federation wants it back. NGO/PVOs are attracted to this area because it represents many issues their organizations stand for; human rights, refugees, religious significance, food shortages, economic potential, capitol project potential, landmines, potential hub of trade, etc. Additionally, the area is relatively easy to move around in and has decent roads and flat terrain. The area was a free for all with the NGO/PVOs. There was no coordination, and competing agendas often clashed. The military mission of keeping peace was difficult in this type of situation. The military commander of the area made an attempt to organize and focus the efforts of the NGO/PVOs for everyone's best interests including the military. The Posavina Working group was formed. The group met weekly at the US base camp where security could be assured, and in a coordinated fashion managed the Posavina corridor. Decisions and action taken as a result of the meetings, were made at the tactical level. The effects of these decisions were strategic in nature, because what happened in the Posavina Corridor directly influenced the NATO mission in Bosnia.. There was no coordinated vision or integrated approach at the national level for the Posavina. The commanders on the ground and the junior leaders of NGO/PVOs made the decisions independent of any clear strategic vision for the Bosnia peace process.

What are we trying to achieve?

Nowhere on any military wiring diagram at any Unified command staff will you find a box for NGO/PVOs to hang their hat. They simply don't reside in a military command. They should. A proposed endstate is to fully integrate NGO/PVOs into the military structure from the top down. We must create doctrine that will consider the NGO/PVO element as a potential combat multiplier versus just an entity we will encounter on the battlefield. Unity of effort maximization is the goal. Clearly, the consequence of not taking into account the impact of these organizations is to risk unnecessary adverse impact on the operation at all levels.

During the day to day operations of the Unified and Joint Staffs, NGO/PVO leadership should be included where appropriate. By influencing and including the NGP/PVO leadership in all aspects of planning we effectively influence the organizations' impact in the field during operations. Our doctrine must accommodate this type of civil/military planning effort as a matter of routine. It is no longer acceptable, given the predicted future MOOTW, to wait until the ground commander encounters the NGO/PVO groups on the ground and then begin dialogue. One of the golden rules of MOOTW is for the military force to maintain it's neutrality and not take sides. A well intentioned tactical commander, not trained on integrating NGO/PVO in the military plan, may inadvertently assist certain PVO/NGO and inadvertently give the wrong impression of taking sides. A mistake of this magnitude could have immediate strategic implications and jeopardize the mission.

The scope of this issue is large. The sheer numbers of NGO/PVO organizations make the development of any doctrine designed to manage them almost impossible.

Beginning with US national organizations is a good start. Organizational networking worldwide will begin to include the international organizations over time as our doctrine matures. While the thought of cooperating and maybe even working with an organization such as Greenpeace may make military professionals cringe, the consequence of not cooperating may lead to mission failure.

The goal of establishing a national level coordinating agency at the Joint Staff and creating doctrine to support the effort will serve many purposes. First and foremost, the doctrine will inform and reach commanders at all levels and educate the military on NGO/PVO issues. We will institutionalize the planning for these organizations and agencies as a part of all our military plans. Treating the senior leadership of NGO/PVOs as equals with CINCs during planning events will pay big dividends. Expectations, capabilities and relationships will be known. Over time these relationships will become founded on mutual understanding. Agendas will be on the table from the outset of any operation and the potential for cross purpose action in the field at the tactical level will be minimized. This illustrates the need for this type of coordination to be top down. Failure and difficulty arise when well intentioned military commanders and well intentioned NGO/PVO field managers are at odds over purpose method and endstate of the operation. Untimely clashing of agendas can have strategic implications.

Bottom line is to create doctrine to synergize the presence of NGO/PVOs. Plan for coordination, cooperation and integration in order to maximize unity of effort.

What ways will get us there?

There are many ways to achieve the ends described. Most are really rooted in an acceptance of the concept in NGO/PVO integration into planning at the highest levels. Establishment of the NGO/PVO coordination staff element on the Chairman's staff is a good start point. This sends the signal worldwide that the military is serious about this stuff and we recognize the importance of the NGO/PVO organizations on the battlefield. From the Joint Staff this effort can be synchronized with the interagency process and take advantage of the already established policy and procedures as appropriate. Inclusion of the CEOs and Senior management of the NGO/PVO at the joint staff planning events will facilitate execution on the ground of any MOOTW operation. The military commander on the ground can be assured that his NGO/PVO counterpart is acting on orders from their bosses who have been included in the planning at the Joint Staff level from the beginning. This is powerful stuff and should go a long way toward a maximized unity of effort. There should not be any false expectations or unclear agendas by any group whose boss has been included in the military planning phases.

NGO/PVOs should be included in appropriate military exercises. Our system of military exercises at all levels is excellent and we should begin to bring in the CEOs of the organizations to participate. The idea is to engage the NGO/PVOs now and not wait for the real operation to begin to plan for their presence on the battlefield.

The military officer school system is another example of where NGO/PVOs could be integrated into the military planning process. Exposure to these organizations early in the company grade officer's schooling is positive.

Do we have the means to do it?

In a resource constrained environment, significant dollar expenditure and allocation to achieve the ends is not a viable option here. However, this is a concept, not a new technological development or a long procurement of a weapon system.

By evolving our doctrine to include the NGO/PVO dimension, we will achieve a much improved unity of effort on the complex contingency battlefield of the future. I would speculate that many if not most of the NGO/PVOs will jump at the chance to be included in military planning and exercises as a matter of routine. Inclusion into our exercises could be voluntary at little or no cost to the DOD. The only real cost of this concept is the time and resources necessary to create and write the doctrine. It is the doctrine that will cause training and planning to occur at all levels.

The second and third order effects of this type of approach are many. Positive interface between the military and the NGO/PVOs is a good thing. Over time, trust and understanding will occur and will be carried over to the operation on the ground. Quicker lines of coordination at the top between senior military commanders and NGO/PVO executives will facilitate issues on the ground. The potential for crossed or opposed agendas will be minimized. The simple fact of knowing about each other's organization

will greatly help unity of effort. Bottom line, this is a more synergistic approach to the integration of the NGO/PVO element.

Obstacles along the way

While this doctrine is a good idea, there could be potential negative sides that need to be addressed. Of course, there will be some NGO/PVOs who will not want to be a part of this initiative. Knowledge of this in itself is good information for the military and helps the overall management effort. We can anticipate and make plans for these non-cooperating organizations and thereby still protect and foster our unity effort. Clearly, not all NGO/PVOs will be a team player. We cannot expect this concept to be received enthusiastically by all organizations. This is just a fact of life and certainly not a show stopper. Additionally, the large number of NGO/PVOs would make it impossible to include all of them in every planning event or exercise. Therefore the largest and most influential and those who usually move to a peacekeeping environment should be solicited to participate in exercises. It is with these large NGO/PVOs, that are always present in a conflict, that we should build a lasting planning relationship.

Reliance on the military logistically and for security is already a problem in the field. At a glance this initiative could be viewed as having the potential to increase the problem. Armed with this knowledge, we can ensure through exercises, coordination meetings and other contact that NGO/PVO do not have false expectations of military

support to their organization. This doctrine will in fact teach real expectations for both the NGO/PVOs and the military.

We have seen in Bosnia that not all NGOs/PVOs want a conflict to end and may have agendas that are supported by prolonging an operation. If not aware, the military could be drawn into unwittingly supporting their agenda. The more we know about the NGO/PVOs the better and easier to manage. Routine engagement facilitates this knowledge base. Related to this issue is the current tendency for NGO/PVOs to rely more and more on the military during an operation of extended time. Reliance has the effect of prolonging the operation and negatively impacts the military exit strategy. Doctrine and routine engagement will help minimize this problem.

What should I tell the boss?

The US military has a proven track record of realizing the need for new and updated doctrine. We have in fact changed our doctrine to adapt to the changing world environment and new technologies. Our current National Security strategy predicts a future where there will be more and more involvement of US military in OOTW. It is time to update our doctrine again. Time to incorporate the new dimensions of the complex contingency battlefield. We must deliberately plan for the impact of the NGO/PVO element.

I recommend the formation of national level systems that attempt to integrate and maximize unity of effort between the military and the NGO/PVO group. "Military civic action can, in concert with the other elements of a US strategy, be an effective means of achieving US objectives around the globe." Additionally, updated doctrine to support this national initiative needs to be developed. The doctrine must be trainable during peacetime and spawn the development of schooling and exercises to expose and educate military leaders at all levels.

The benefits to be gained from filling this doctrinal void are significant. We will be more prepared to execute complex contingencies. We will enter the operation synchronized tactically with the strategic direction and vision for the integration of NGO/PVOs. The military and civilian relationships should improve and become more founded on trust over time. General education about the military among NGO/PVOs will increase, thereby avoiding false expectations and reliance that can negatively impact any operation. Simply stated, we better prepare ourselves for the 21st century challenges of the complex contingency type operation.

This paper has specifically addressed an approach to better integrating, at the strategic level, the NGO/PVO elements of any future operation whether it be a complex contingency like peacekeeping or actual conventional war. The strategic impact of the NGO/PVO on the battlefield has been identified. A glance at recent operations shows that our doctrine is lacking in this area. The ends of creating a new doctrine and supporting systems were proposed. Effective ways of implementing were discussed and a means to get there was explored. The timing for developing this type of doctrine is perfectly aligned with the spirit of advancement described in Joint Vision 2010 and the

Army After Next program. Given a smaller force and more demands worldwide, we cannot afford to ignore the potential for achieving a greater unity of effort with the NGO/PVO population. This is clearly a matter of strategic importance.

ENDNOTES

¹William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, <u>Annual Report to the President and Congress</u>, April 1997.

²Presidential Decision Directive - 56. White Paper, May 1997.

³Chris Seiple, <u>The U.S. Military /NGO Relationship in Humanitarian</u>
<u>Interventions</u>. (Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, 1996), 5

⁴Ibid., 171

⁵Presidential Decision Directive - 56. White Paper, May 1997.

⁶United Nations Document, An Agenda For Peace, 17 June 1992.

⁷Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., <u>Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters</u>, (International Peace Academy: St. Martins Press, 1991), 85.

⁸Joint Warfighting Center, <u>Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace</u> <u>Operations</u>, June 1997, II-3.

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¹⁰Chris Seiple, <u>The U.S. Military /NGO Relationship in Humanitarian</u>
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¹¹Joint Warfighting Center, <u>Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace</u> <u>Operations</u>, June 1997, II-2.

¹²FM100-23, <u>Peace Operations</u>, Chap I.

¹³John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, eds., <u>Winning the Peace, The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action</u> (New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992), VIII.

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